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Abstract
We study the stability of cartels in a di⁄erential game model of oligopoly with
sticky prices (Fershtman and Kamien 1987). We show that when ￿rms use closed-loop
strategies and the rate of increase of the marginal cost is ￿small enough￿ , the grand
coalition (i.e., when the cartel includes all ￿rms) is stable: it is unpro￿table for a ￿rm
to exit the cartel. Moreover, a cartel of 3 ￿rms is stable for any positive rate of increase
of the marginal cost: it is not pro￿table for an insider ￿rm to exit the coalition, nor
it is pro￿table for an outsider ￿rm to join the coalition. When ￿rms use open-loop
strategies the grand coalition is never stable; moreover, we show that only a cartel of
size 2 can be stable and it is so only when the rate of increase of the marginal cost is
large enough.
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11 Introduction
Intuitively, in an oligopolistic market the formation of a cartel that acts as a multiplant
￿rm and competes against the other ￿rms should be bene￿cial for the cartel members. This
intuition can be wrong, however. When ￿rms compete a la Cournot it is well known from
the merger literature1 that the formation of a cartel by a subset of ￿rms may reduce its
members￿pro￿ts. Indeed, in a static Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and constant
marginal cost, a cartel (or merger) of a subset of ￿rms is pro￿table only if they represent
a signi￿cant share of the market prior to the formation of the cartel (see Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds, 1983, SSR henceforth). In particular, if there are three or more ￿rms in the
industry, a cartel formed by two ￿rms always decreases their total pro￿ts. This remains
to be true when marginal cost is not constant as long as the cartel does not experience
￿large￿e¢ ciency gain, such is the case when the cost function takes the quadratic form of
cq + 1
2q2 (where c is constant and q is the output). This result can be intuitively explained
by the following: The cartel has an incentive to reduce its members￿output relative to their
production prior to the cartel. Then the outsiders react by increasing their production,
which reduces the pro￿ts of the cartel members.
The above important result in static oligopoly theory does not generalize to dynamic
oligopolies. In a model of dynamic oligopoly with price dynamics (Fershtman and Kamien,
1987), linear demand and quadratic cost function of the form cq+ 1
2q2; Dockner and Gauners-
dorfer (2001) conduct numerical simulations and obtain a very interesting result: all cartels
are pro￿table2. This is in sharp contrast with the conclusions in the static framework.
Since all cartels are pro￿table it is natural to ask which cartel size is more likely to
emerge. To address this question we consider a stability criterion. A cartel is stable if no
insider ￿rm has an incentive to exit the cartel and no outsider ￿rm would wish to join the
cartel. Such a stability notion was ￿rst introduced by D￿ Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabsewicz,
and Weymark (1983) in a price leadership model in which the dominant cartel acts as the
leader and ￿rms in the competitive fringe take price as given. Although this stability notion
can be adapted to the context of static Cournot competition, it is easy to see that with three
or more ￿rms, no cartel is stable in the case of linear demand and constant marginal cost.
1The objective of a cartel is identical to the objective of a merged ￿rm, adopted in the merger literature
(Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983), when a subset of ￿rms merge. Throughout this paper, the term cartel
can be substituted by the term merger and vice versa.
2Benchekroun (2003) shows analytically that such a result generalizes to the case where the number of
￿rms is arbitrarily large: a cartel of 2 ￿rms is pro￿table even when the number of ￿rms tends to in￿nity.
2We study the stability of cartels in the dynamic oligopoly model with sticky prices. We
consider a generalized version the framework of Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and Dockner
and Gaunersdorfer (2001). They focus on the case where the coe¢ cient of the quadratic
term is one (i.e., the rate of change of the marginal cost is one). We allow for a general
quadratic cost function and such a generalization turns out to have important implications
in determining the stability of cartels (although all cartels remain pro￿table). In particular,
when the coe¢ cient of the quadratic term is su¢ ciently low, the grand coalition (i.e., cartel
of all ￿rms) is stable; that is, no ￿rm can bene￿t from exiting the grand coalition. When
the rate of change of the marginal cost is one, only coalitions of three ￿rms are stable,
regardless of the total number ￿rms. In fact, size-three coalitions remain stable for any
general quadratic cost function.
The above results hold when ￿rms use close-loop strategies whereby a ￿rm￿ s strategy
speci￿es a production rate at a given moment as a function of that moment and the level of
the price (the state variable) at that moment. For comparison, we also consider open-loop
strategies where a ￿rm￿ s strategy corresponds to a production path announced at time zero
and, de￿ned over the whole in￿nite time horizon. It is well known that the steady state of an
open-loop equilibrium ￿coincides with the Cournot equilibrium of the corresponding static
game￿(Dockner 1992, see also Dockner et al. 2000). An open-loop Nash equilibrium is in
general not subgame perfect but a closed-loop Nash equilibrium is by construction subgame
perfect. As a benchmark, the open-loop case allows us to isolate the impact of feedback
strategies on the stability of cartels. We show that when ￿rms use open-loop strategies, the
grand coalition is never stable. We also show that only a cartel of two ￿rms can be stable
and it is so only when the cost function is su¢ ciently convex.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and the
formal de￿nition of the stability of a cartel. In section 3 we provide the open-loop and the
closed-loop Nash equilibrium after a cartel forms. In section 4 we examine the stability of
cartels.
2 The model
Consider an industry with N identical ￿rms producing an homogeneous product. The pro-






3where c ￿ 0 and ￿ > 0. Note that ￿ = 1 in Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and Dockner and
Gaunersdorfer (2001).
Let p(t) denote the price of the output. Due to price stickiness, the adjustment process
of the price to a change in quantity is given





qi (t) ￿ p(t)
!
with p(0) = p0 ￿ 0 (1)
where a > c and 0 < s ￿ 1 is a parameter that captures the speed of the adjustment of the
price. (1) implies a linear inverse demand function.












subject to (1) where r > 0 denotes the interest rate.
We consider two strategy spaces. The ￿rst set of strategies is the open-loop strategy set
where one ￿rm￿ s strategy de￿nes this ￿rm￿ s production path for the whole time horizon. The
second set of strategies considered is the set of closed-loop strategies where the production
of ￿rm i at time t is allowed to depend on t and the price level at time t; p(t)3.
A closed-loop (open-loop) Nash equilibrium for the pre-cartel game, i.e. the game





N) such that each strategy ￿
￿
















We then consider the possibility of a cartel of M ￿rms, M ￿ N. Without loss of generality
assume that in the case of a cartel of M ￿rms, the insider ￿rms (￿rms that form the cartel)
are the ￿rst M ￿rms, i.e. ￿rm j = 1;::;M. If M < N, the outsider ￿rms are ￿rms k ,
k = M + 1;::;N.
The objective of a cartel of M ￿rms is to maximize the joint discounted sum of pro￿ts






3For a formal de￿nition of these strategy sets see for example Fershtman and Kamien (1987), De￿nition
1 and De￿nition 3, page 1154.
4The cartel takes the production strategies, ￿k with k = M +1;::;N, of the outsider ￿rms as
given and chooses an M-tuple vector of production strategies (￿1;::;￿M) that solves
max J
C
subject to (1). The problem of an outsider ￿rm k, with M + 1 ￿ k ￿ N, is to maximize Jk
subject to (1) by choosing a strategy while taking the strategies of the cartel and N ￿M ￿1
other outsiders as given.
A closed-loop (open-loop) Nash equilibrium of the game when a cartel of M ￿rms forms














































for all ￿k and all k = M + 1;::;N:





















N) is a closed-loop (open-loop) Nash equilibrium of the game without a cartel








is a closed-loop (open-loop) Nash equilibrium when M ￿rms
form a cartel. Since we assume that the ￿rms are symmetric we focus on the symmetric
equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium with a cartel of M ￿rms such that
￿j = ￿ins for all j = 1;::;M
and
￿k = ￿out for all k = M + 1;::;N
where ￿ins and ￿out are strategies of insiders and outsiders respectively. Given that the
marginal cost of a ￿rm is increasing with the quantity produced and that ￿rms are symmetric,
the cartel equally splits the overall production and (hence) pro￿ts among its members.
Note that by setting M = 1 we obtain the case of a symmetric oligopoly with N ￿rms4.
4The symmetric Cournot oligopoly can also be obtained as a special case of this game with 0 insiders and
N outsiders.
5Stability of a Cartel
When all cartel sizes are pro￿table, a natural follow up question is: which of the pro￿table
cartels are more likely to emerge? We use a stability criterion to answer this question.
The concept of stability used here is the one proposed by D￿ Aspremont et al. (1983). It
will be convenient to introduce the following notations for insiders￿and outsiders￿pro￿ts at



















for any j = M + 1;::;N:
A cartel of M ￿rms is internally stable if
￿ins (M;N) ￿ ￿out (M ￿ 1;N); (3)
i.e., no insider of cartel has an incentive to unilaterally exit.
A cartel of M ￿rms is externally stable if
￿out (M;N) ￿ ￿ins (M + 1;N); (4)
i.e., no outsider ￿rm has an incentive to join the cartel of the M ￿rms.
A cartel of M ￿rms is stable if it is both internally and externally stable.
Remark 1: If a cartel of M ￿rms is strictly internally stable (i.e. ￿ins (M;N) > ￿out (M ￿ 1;N))
then a cartel of M ￿1 is, necessarily, externally unstable. Conversely, if a cartel of M ￿rms
is internally unstable then a cartel of size M ￿ 1 is externally stable.
Remark 2: In the case of the grand coalition, i.e. when M = N, only internal stability is
relevant.
Remark 3: A cartel of two ￿rms is pro￿table if and only if a cartel of size 2 is internally
stable.
The objective of this paper is to determine, among the pro￿table cartels, the ones that
are stable. To this end we must characterize the equilibrium pro￿ts of ￿rms (insiders and
outsiders) when a cartel forms.
3 The equilibrium with a cartel
In this section, we determine the equilibrium of the game when M ￿rms form a cartel. For
simplicity we set c = 0. This is innocuous but it simpli￿es the expressions that characterize
the close-loop equilibrium we study.
63.1 The case of open-loop strategies
Proposition 1 There exists an asymptotically stable steady-state open-loop Nash equilib-
rium of the post-cartel game. The equilibrium production rates and the price at the steady
state are given by
q
OL
ins = ￿ (￿ + R) (5)
q
OL
out = ￿ (￿ + MR) (6)
and
p





where R ￿ s
r+s and ￿ ￿ a
￿2+￿N+￿R+MR+MR￿+MRN￿M2R+MR2 > 0:
Proof. The proof is omitted. It is a straightforward extension of Proposition 1 in Benchekroun
(2003) to arbitrary ￿ > 0.
























2MR￿ + ￿R + 2MR
2 + ￿
2￿
(￿ + R) (8)
It can be veri￿ed that in the limit case where the adjustment speed is in￿nite, i.e. when
price adjusts instantaneously, the steady-state equilibrium price, quantities and pro￿ts cor-
respond exactly to the outcome of a one shot static Cournot game. This is in line with
Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and is similar to the result in Dockner (1992) where, for an
adjustment cost di⁄erential game, it is shown that the steady state open-loop equilibrium
￿coincides with the Cournot equilibrium of the corresponding static game￿ .
In this context a cartel is pro￿table only if the pre-cartel market share of the member
￿rms is large enough. In particular, when ￿ tends to 0; the results of SSR emerge.
In the remainder of the paper, as in Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and Dockner and
Gaunersdorfer (2001), we shall focus on the limit case where s tends to 1. This facilitates





2 (￿ + 1)(2M￿ + ￿ + 2M + ￿2)
(￿2 + ￿N + ￿ + 2M + M￿ + MN ￿ M2)
2 (9)
5If c > 0; a2 should be replaced with (a ￿ c)






2 (￿ + M)(2M￿ + ￿ + 2M + ￿2)
(￿2 + ￿N + ￿ + 2M + M￿ + MN ￿ M2)
2 (10)
The results of this section will serve as a benchmark that will allow us to isolate and
identify the role played by closed-loop strategies.
3.2 The case of closed-loop strategies
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￿ (1 ￿ Kc) ￿ 1




MKc + (N ￿ M)Kk ￿ 1 ￿ N < 0: (11)




￿ + ((2(N ￿ M) ￿ 1)Kk + MKc ￿ N ￿ ￿)
Ek
￿ = aKk
(MKc ￿ N + (N ￿ M)Kk ￿ ￿) Ec







out (:) constitute close-loop equilibrium strategies for the insider
and outsider ￿rms respectively.
Proof. The proof is omitted. It is a straightforward extension of Proposition 3 in Dockner
and Gaunersdorfer (2001) to the case of an arbitrary ￿ > 0.
Remark 4: Condition (11) ensures that the steady-state equilibrium price is asymptotically
stable.
To determine the steady-state pro￿ts of an insider ￿rm, we need to determine the steady-
state production of each ￿rm (insider and outsider ￿rms) and the steady-state price as a
function of M and N. This requires us to determine solutions to the system (SK). However,
the system (SK) is nonlinear and an analytical solution of (Kc;Kk) as explicit functions of
N and M; when it exists, is in general impossible to obtain6. Dockner and Gaunersdorfer
6For example, substitution of Kc from the second equation of the system (SK) into the ￿rst equation
yields a polynomial of degree 4 in Kk for which the roots can be determined explicitly but are too complex
to o⁄er any insight, see Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001).
8(2001) solve the system numerically for speci￿c values of N and M while Benchekroun
(2003) shows the existence of a solution to this system.
The steady-state equilibrium price is the solution to




a￿ ￿ MEc + MEk ￿ NEk
N + ￿ ￿ MKc + MKk ￿ NKk
where Kc, Kk, Ec and Ek are respectively given by (SK) and (SE).

































Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001), numerically establish that all cartels are pro￿table in a
10 ￿rm industry and that a cartel of 2 ￿rms remains pro￿table when the total number of
￿rms varies between 2 and 10. Benchekroun (2003) shows analytically that this remains true
even when the total number of ￿rms in an industry is arbitrarily large.
It can be shown that the discounted sum of pro￿ts of an insider ￿rm and an outsider ￿rm











(2MEc ￿ Ek ￿ 2a￿ ￿ 2MEk + 2NEk)Ek
￿r
: (13)
We now turn to the main question of the paper: Are these cartels stable?
4 Stability
4.1 The case of open-loop strategies
When ￿rms use open-loop strategies, pro￿tability of a cartel depends on ￿: With small ￿;
for a cartel to be pro￿table, it has to represent a signi￿cant pre-cartel market share. For
9example, when ￿ = 1, it can be shown that a minimum market share of 69% is necessary for
a cartel to be pro￿table. However, only size-2 cartel can be stable and it is so only when ￿
is su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 3 If N ￿ M ￿ 3; then no cartel is stable.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The proof of Proposition 3 detailed in Appendix 1 consists of showing that no cartel of
size 3 or larger is internally stable. An insider ￿rm always gains by leaving the cartel. Even
if a merger of M ￿rms (M ￿ 3) may be pro￿table it is even pro￿table not to be a member
of the merged entity.
Proposition 4 A cartel of size 2 is not stable if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿N ￿ 3(N ￿ 2:6) and is stable if
￿ ￿ ^ ￿N ￿ 3(N ￿ 2:4).
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Propositions 3 and 4 also imply the following results.
Corollary 1 If N ￿ 3; the grand coalition is never stable.
Corollary 2 If ￿ ￿ 1 and N ￿ 3; then no cartel is stable.
From this analysis we conclude that the only possible size of a stable cartel is 2. Indeed,
from Proposition 3 a cartel of size 3 is not stable because it is internally unstable and therefore
a cartel of size 2 is always externally stable (see Remark 1). The proof of Proposition 4,
detailed in Appendix 2, consists of showing that a cartel of size 2 can be internally stable
(or pro￿table, see Remark 3) when ￿ is below some threshold. For a given total number of
￿rms N, a cartel of two ￿rms can only be stable if the cost function is su¢ ciently convex
(￿ ￿ ^ ￿N). For example, when N = 5 and ￿ ￿ 7:8; a cartel of two ￿rms is stable. A large
rate of increase of ￿rms￿marginal cost ensures that the increase in production of the outsider
￿rms following a merger will be moderate, while the gain from a decrease in production of
the merged ￿rms is large. Therefore when the cost function is su¢ ciently convex a merger
of two ￿rms becomes pro￿table and a size 2 cartel is stable. When the cost function is not
su¢ ciently convex no cartel is stable.
104.2 The case of closed-loop strategies
In contrast to the open-loop case, simulations indicate that all cartels are pro￿table regardless
of ￿; when we consider close-loop equilibrium; moreover, stable cartels do exist in this case
for all non negative values of ￿. One surprising result we obtain is that the grand coalition
(i.e., the cartel of all ￿rms) is stable when ￿ (the rate of change in marginal cost) is low. In
addition, cartels of size 3 is stable regardless of ￿.
4.2.1 Stability of the grand coalition
We show that the stability of the grand coalition depends on the value of the rate of change
in the marginal cost, ￿.
Proposition 5 For any N ￿ 2 there exists ￿ ￿N > 0 such that for all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿N) the grand
coalition is stable.
Proof. To prove the above proposition, we ￿rst note that for any 0 < ￿ < 1 a multiplant
monopoly earns strictly positive pro￿ts per plant and moreover, the pro￿ts per plant increases
as ￿ decreases7. Next, we show that when ￿ tends to zero, the pro￿t function, as determined
by (13) in Section 3.2, for the ￿rm that exits the grand coalition (i.e., the outsider of a cartel
of size N ￿1) tends to zero. Therefore when ￿ is close enough to zero, the outsider￿ s pro￿ts
become arbitrarily small. Consequently, no ￿rm would wish to exit the grand coalition. Thus
the proof consists of showing that when M = N ￿ 1; the discounted sum of pro￿ts of the
outsider tends to zero when ￿ becomes arbitrarily small. This is done in Appendix 3.
We note that this result is in contrast with Corollary 1 derived for the open-loop case.
The di⁄erence is solely due to the nature of the strategies used. Kamien and Fershtman
(1987) show that the outcome of a closed-loop game is closer to a competitive outcome
than the outcome of an open-loop game8. This remains true in the case of a ￿nite horizon
di⁄erential game with sticky prices when the time horizon is long enough (see Kamien and
Fershtman (1990)).
As long as a cartel has at least one fringe ￿rm, the smaller the value of the positive cost
parameter ￿ the closer is the closed-loop equilibrium outcome of the game to price-taking
behavior. When ￿ tends to zero price tends to the marginal cost and pro￿ts tend to zero.
That is, when ￿ is small enough the pro￿ts of all competing ￿rms and cartel in the closed-loop
7We can also obtain the closed form solution for the per plant pro￿ts.
8Dockner (1988) generalizes this result to the case of an oligopoly.
11equilibrium become very small (see Table 1)9. If a ￿rm exits the grand-coalition, it would
face an exacerbated competition due to the feedback e⁄ect and would get lower pro￿ts than
if it had remained in the coalition.
We note however that as ￿ becomes larger, the grand coalition is no longer stable. This
is illustrated10 in the table below for the case that N = 10 and a = 100:
Table 1
￿ 0:001 0:19 0:2 1 10
￿ins (M = N = 10) 250:0 247:65 247:52 238:10 166:67
￿out (M = 9;N = 10) 1:927 240:68 248:47 415:97 197:45
From these simulations we get that the critical value of ￿ beyond which the grand coalition
in a 10 ￿rms industry stops being stable is approximately equal to 0:20:
4.2.2 Another stable cartel size
It is interesting to note that the grand coalition may not be the unique stable cartel. Nu-
merical simulations indicate that for all ￿ > 0 a cartel of size 3 is stable for all N ￿ 4.
In the ￿rst set of simulations we set ￿ = 0:1;N = 10 and a = 100. We obtain that 3 and
10 (the grand coalition are the two stable cartels:
Table 2
M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
￿ins 6:02 6:12 6:38 6:85 7:63 8:92 11:20 15:92 30:18 248:88
￿out 6:02 6:32 6:97 8:13 10:17 13:97 22:01 44:07 152:60
9We actually obtain a rather interesting result. The pro￿ts of ￿rms are inversely U shaped functions of
the cost parameter ￿. When ￿ is small enough, ￿rms are able to achieve larger pro￿ts when ￿ increases. A
similar result was obtained in a static framework by Seade (1985).
10This result was con￿rmed by additional simulations that were carried out for other parameter values.
Numerical simulations were carried out with MuPad Pro 3.0.
12In the second set of simulations we set ￿ = 1;N = 10 and a = 100. We obtain that 3 is
the only stable cartel:
Table 3
M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
￿ins 49:02 49:61 51:29 54:26 58:98 66:27 77:87 97:73 136:90 238:10
￿out 49:02 50:97 55:17 62:45 74:48 94:85 132:00 209:60 416:00
In the third set of simulations we set ￿ = 5;N = 10 and a = 100. We obtain that 3 is
the only stable cartel size:
Table 4
M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
￿ins 121:4 122:0 123:9 127:2 132:0 138:7 147:7 160:0 176:7 200:0
￿out 121:4 123:7 128:6 136:5 148:2 164:8 188:6 223:1 275:0
Other simulations for di⁄erent values of N and ￿ con￿rm that 3 is a stable cartel size
for all ￿ > 0 This is also in contrast with the case where ￿rms use open-loop strategies,
where size 2 cartel is stable only for su¢ ciently convex production cost (￿ ￿ ^ ￿N). There are
comparable results in the literature on the stability of cartels in a static framework where it
is shown that only cartels of small sizes are stable.
Donsimoni et al. (1986) show that in D￿ Aspremont et al.￿ s price leadership model with
competitive fringe, results similar as ours emerge with linear demand function and quadratic
cost function without the linear term. Either there is a unique stable cartel M < N when
the ￿rms are not too cost e¢ cient relative to demand or there are two stable cartels N and
M < N otherwise. In particular, when cost function of each ￿rm is C(q) = 1
2q2 and there are
at least four ￿rms, the only stable cartel size is three. Note, however, the demand function
used by Donsimoni et al. (1986) is D(p) = N(a￿bp); which is a function of N: Nonetheless,
the similarity between their results and ours is intriguing.
Sha⁄er (1995) considers the case where the cartel acts as a Stackelberg leader and the
outsider ￿rms constitute a Cournot fringe. She investigates how the size of the stable cartel
is related to the number of ￿rms in a setting with linear demand and constant marginal
cost. Konishi and Lin (1999) proves the existence of a stable cartel with general demand
and cost functions. In an example they show that with demand function D(p) = a ￿ Q
and cost function C(q) = 1
2q2, size of stable cartel increase with N: This is in contrast to
13that in D￿ Aspremont et al.￿ s price leadership model with the same demand function and cost
function, the size of stable cartel is 3 for N > 5:
Diamantoudi (2005) shows that if ￿rms are endowed with foresight, larger cartels are
stable. The stability proposed in Diamantoudi (2005) captures the foresight of any ￿rm
that contemplates leaving (joining) a cartel. In particular, each ￿rm anticipates that after it
leaves the grand coalition, other ￿rms may also leave afterwards and consequently, its pro￿ts
may decrease ultimately to a level below those of an insider of the grand coalition.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that when ￿rms use open-loop strategies, the grand coalition is never stable.
We have also shown that only a cartel of size 2 can be stable and it is so only when the
cost function is su¢ ciently convex, i.e., when ￿; the rate of increase of the marginal cost, is
su¢ ciently high. Furthermore, no cartel with 3 or more ￿rms is stable for all values of ￿.
Note that a large cartel may be pro￿table, but each ￿rm earns even larger pro￿ts by exiting
the cartel. Like the static Cournot equilibrium, open-loop equilibrium in the dynamic model
we analyze cannot be used to explain the stability of the grand coalition.
We have shown that when ￿rms use closed-loop strategies, the grand coalition is stable
for small enough ￿. The closed-loop e⁄ect renders not only all cartels pro￿table but also the
grand coalition stable. For larger values of ￿ the grand coalition is no longer stable; however
the coalition size of 3 emerges as the only coalition size that is stable regardless of ￿:
It could also be interesting to investigate the pro￿tability and stability of cartels when
￿rms play a non-linear equilibrium. It is known that the game studied in this paper, i.e.
a Cournot competition with sticky prices, admits a continuum of equilibria with non-linear
strategies (see Tsutsui and Mino (1990)).
14Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 3
We show that if N ￿ M ￿ 3; then no cartel is stable.
Internal stability of size-M cartel requires that ￿OL
out (M ￿ 1;N) ￿ ￿OL
ins (M;N) ￿ 0 or
A
B ￿ C
D < 0 where
A = (￿ + (M ￿ 1))
￿





2 + ￿N + ￿ + 2(M ￿ 1) + (M ￿ 1)￿ + (M ￿ 1)N ￿ (M ￿ 1)
2￿2
C = (￿ + 1)
￿





2 + ￿N + ￿ + 2M + M￿ + MN ￿ M
2￿2 :
Since B > 0 and D > 0; A
B ￿ C
D < 0 if and only if AD￿BC < 0.AD￿BC can be written
as






2 + ￿1￿ + ￿0
￿
where
￿5 = M ￿ 2
￿4 = 2MN ￿ 4N ￿ 10M + 4M
2 + 3


















































To show that no cartel is stable when N ￿ M ￿ 3, it su¢ ces to show that size-M cartel
is internally unstable, i.e., AD ￿ BC > 0: To this end, we shall show that ￿‘ > 0 for all
‘ = 0;1;:::;5 if N ￿ M ￿ 3:
Obviously, ￿5 > 0: We now proceed to show that ￿4 > 0: ￿4 is an increasing function
of N given N ￿ 3: If N = M; we have ￿4 = 6M2 ￿ 14M + 3 > 0: Thus, ￿4 > 0: Now,
consider ￿3: Observe ￿rst that if M = 3; ￿3 = 24N +N2 +1 > 0. It can be show that when
N ￿ M ￿ 3;
d￿3
dM
= 16MN ￿ 18N ￿ 16M + 9M
2 + N
2 ￿ 5 > 0:
15To show that ￿2 > 0; when N = M; ￿2 = 42:0M ￿ 39:0M2 ￿ 8:0M3 + 8:0M4 ￿ 7:0 > 0
as M ￿ 3: Also, we observe that
d￿2
dN




which is positive given that N ￿ M ￿ 3: Thus, ￿2 > 0:
Next, ￿1 can be written as
￿1 = (M ￿ 1)F
where











To show that F > 0; we ￿rst examine
dF
dN




When N = M; F = M ￿ 38M2 + 16M3 + 9 > 0 if M ￿ 3: Thus, we need only to
show that dF
dN ￿ 0: When N = M ￿ 3, dF
dN = 8M3 ￿ 4M2 ￿ 18M + 6 > 0. Moreover,
d2F
dN2 = 10M2 ￿ 14M + 2 > 0 if M ￿ 3: Thus, F > 0; which implies ￿1 > 0:
Lastly, a0 can be written as
￿0 = 2M (M ￿ 1)
2 ￿
N










This quadratic function of N in the last bracket is strictly increasing in N. Indeed,










= 4M ￿ 6 > 0 for M ￿ 2:









2 ￿ 9 + 10M








2 ￿ 9 + 10M
= 4M ￿ 9 > 0 for all M ￿ 3
Therefore, ￿0 > 0
16Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
We show that if N ￿ 2:6 + 1
3￿; cartel of size 2 is not stable.
If M = 2; we have














4 ￿ 21￿ ￿ 4:






2 + 2(￿ + 1)
p
(￿ + 2)(￿ + 4) + 4
￿
:





2 + 2(￿ + 1)(￿ + 2) + 4
￿





2 + 2(￿ + 1)
p























Thus, if N ￿ 2:6+ 1
3￿; then AD￿BC > 0, implying that size-2 cartel is not internally stable
and if N ￿ 2:4 + 1
3￿ size-2 cartel is not internally stable
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 5
We show in this appendix that lim￿!0 Gout = 0 where Gout is given by (13). From
Proposition 2, the equations that determine the parameters are obtained by setting M =
N ￿ 1, which yields:
for Kc and Kk;
1
2











for Ec and Ek;
Kk (N ￿ 1)
Ec
￿





















(Ek ￿ 2Ec ￿ 2a￿ + 2NEc)Ek
￿r
(19)





￿ < 1 as these would imply that lim￿!0 Ec = 0 and lim￿!0 Ek = 0: To this
end, we ￿rst solve for Ec
￿ and
Ek




















where D ￿ 2NKc ￿ 2N2Kc + (N ￿ 1)KcKk + (N ￿ Kk)
2 + (N ￿ 1)
2 K2
c: It can be shown
that the system for Kk and Kc admits only ￿nite solutions11. Then it su¢ ces to show that
D 6= 0:
Assume in negation that D = 0: Equations (14) and (15) imply that




c ￿ 1 = 0
and
2NKcKk ￿ 2￿Kk ￿ 2KcKk ￿ 2NKk + K
2
k + 1 = 0:
When ￿ tends to zero we have




c ￿ 1 = 0 (20)
and
2(N ￿ 1)KcKk ￿ 2NKk + K
2
k + 1 = 0: (21)
From (20), we can obtain




c + 1 (22)
11As noted in footnote 4 any solution (Kk;Kc) to the system (S) is such that Kk (or Kc) corresponds to a




2 ￿ 1 ￿ 2(N ￿ 1)KcKk (23)












If N > 1; we have





























Substituting (24) into equation (21) gives
K
2








+ 1 = 0:



























It is easy to verify that neither of these roots coincides with (25). This leads to the conclusion
that D 6= 0. Therefore lim￿!0
Ec
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